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cyBer warFare and the Jus ad Bellum challenges: evaluation
in light oF the tallinn manual
on the international law aPPlicaBle to cyBer warFare
ido kilovaty1

1. introduction
In 2010, the computer networks of the Iranian nuclear research facility in Natanz were infected
by a malware, which caused unexpected detrimental physical destruction. The “Stuxnet” virus was
specifically programmed to cause damage to the uranium-enriching infrastructure at the Natanz
nuclear facility, achieving its goal in two different ways. Firstly, when specific configurations are
met at the recipient network systems, Stuxnet forces the centrifuges to speed up to a speed that
essentially destroys those centrifuges. Secondly, Stuxnet sends false signals to the monitoring system
of the nuclear facility, obscuring real-time data and by doing so, thus disabling the safety system
responsible for shutting down the facility in case such irregularities occur.2
In fact, Stuxnet managed to disrupt the process of uranium enrichment, causing devastating
and irreversible damage to at least a thousand centrifuges out of a total of five thousand centrifuges
in Natanz.3 Today, it is believed that both the United States and Israel are behind the cyber attack
on the Natanz nuclear facility, and that the Stuxnet virus had been intentionally designed to target
and infect specifically configured network systems, namely those at the Natanz nuclear facility.4
However, it was claimed that Stuxnet diffused and infected a Russian nuclear plant, as well as the
International Space Station,5 and more than just the Natanz nuclear plant computers were infected.6
The consequences of the Stuxnet virus were quite unprecedented. Unlike the preceding highscale cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, which targeted banks, telecommunication and other websites
1 LL.B. (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ’12), LL.M. (University of California, Berkeley, ‘14), S.J.D Candidate
(Georgetown University, ’17).
2 See William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Singer, Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, the
new york times (Jan. 15, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.
html?pagewanted=2&_r=0.
3 See Christopher Williams, Barack Obama ‘Ordered Stuxnet Cyber Attack on Iran’, the telegraPh (June 1, 2012), available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9305704/Barack-Obama-ordered-Stuxnet-cyber-attack-on-Iran.html.
4 See George Putic, Suxnet: An Effective Cyberwar Weapon, voice oF america (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.
voanews.com/content/stuxnet-an-effective-cyberwar-weapon/1691311.html.
5 Sara Miller, Stuxnet Has Infected Russian Nuclear Plant and International Space Station, the Jerusalem Post (Nov. 12,
2013), available at http://www.jpost.com/International/Stuxnet-has-infected-Russian-nuclear-plant-and-InternationalSpace-Station-331476.
6 Mark Clayton, Stuxnet Cyberweapon Set to Stop Operating, the christian science monitor (June 23, 2012), http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0623/Stuxnet-cyberweapon-set-to-stop-operating.
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and databases while causing no physical destruction or loss of lives,7 and the Russian cyber attacks
during the 2008 War in Georgia, which were similar in their scale to the cyber attacks on Estonia,8
Stuxnet was carried out by state actors, affecting and damaging physical infrastructure of another
state. Such an operation can be characterized as an intervention, which is prohibited under the
customary principle of non-intervention.9 The same concept applies to the use of force or even
an armed attack, which invokes the right to self-defense of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In that
regard, some experts claim that the cyber attack on the Natanz nuclear facility was in fact an armed
attack against Iran, triggering Iran’s right for self-defense.10 On the contrary, and arguably, the cyber
attack on Natanz could be justified by anticipatory self-defense against an imminent threat.11
The example of the Stuxnet cyber attack illustrates the emerging cyber threats to the national
security, following the constantly increasing capabilities of cyber attacks. Cyber attacks today and
in the future are far from mere nuisance, and the capability of catastrophic destruction following a
cyber attack is not a fantasy anymore.
There are numerous legal definitions to ‘cyber attack’ and ‘cyber warfare’. One definition which
might give a hint with regard to the scope of this thesis is the definition in the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, which defines cyber attack as “[a] cyber operation,
whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or
damage or destruction to objects.”12 This definition excludes cyber operations which do not, or are
not expected to cause injury, death, or destruction. Those cyber operations are generally outside the
analysis of jus ad bellum, since they do not reach the required severity that is usually associated with
the use of force.
The novelty and unique characteristics of cyber warfare—also referred to as ‘information
warfare’ by some scholars13—pose many challenges not only to the jus ad bellum but also to
different branches of international law, such as the international humanitarian law, the international
criminal law, and the intellectual property law. Some challenges include the following factors: who
would qualify as a combatant in the cyber context, what measures an attacked state can employ to
repel a cyber attack, and how the international law normally treats cyber espionage and the theft of
intellectual property. Unfortunately, there is no consensus to those and other questions arising from
the uniqueness of cyber warfare.
7 heather harrison dinniss, cyBer warFare and the laws oF war 2 (2012).
8 Eneken Tikk et al., Attacks Against George: Legal Lessons Identified, Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
(Nov. 2008), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Georgia%201%200.pdf.
9 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment I.C.J.
1986, 14, ¶205.
10 See, e.g. int’l grP. oF exPerts, tallin manual on the international law aPPlicaBle to cyBer warFare §13
(Michael Schmitt ed., Cambridge University Press 2013) (“[A] closer case is the 2010 Stuxent operations. In light of the
damage they caused to Iranian centrifuges, some members of the International Group of Experts were of the view that
the operations had reached the armed attack threshold (unless justifiable on the basis of anticipatory self-defence (Rule
15)).”).
11 See id. at §15.
12 Id. at §30.
13 See, e.g. Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 n.y.u. J. int’l l. & Pol. 57
(2001).
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In chapter two, the uniqueness that is associated with cyber warfare will be reviewed in depth.
This chapter will focus on the way in which this type of warfare differs from the common warfare,
as it was known up till today. Moreover, discussing the uniqueness of cyber warfare will significantly
simplify the understanding of how cyber warfare specifically challenges the jus ad bellum, which will
be discussed later in this thesis.
In chapter three, the foundations of this thesis will be laid down by explaining and narrowing
the research question of this thesis, namely how cyber warfare challenges concepts and principles of
contemporary jus ad bellum. To clarify the scope of this thesis, the different international law fields
that are interrelated and often associated with the jus ad bellum will be carefully mapped by briefly
addressing questions of other international law branches with regard to the cyber attacks that are not
part of the research in this thesis. In subsequent subchapters, the terminology that is typically used
in the works of scholarship and official documents will be discussed and explained. In addition,
more elaboration on the governing principles of the jus ad bellum will be given, in order to put cyber
warfare in context, later in this thesis. This chapter will also introduce the most substantive piece of
work on cyber warfare and applicable international law, the Tallinn Manual, as a means to engage with
it later in the analysis.
In chapter four and its subchapters, the substantial analysis part of the research question will
be extensively studied. This chapter will consist of naming the challenges that cyber warfare poses
to the contemporary jus ad bellum. The chapter will also thoroughly analyze those cyber operations
that amount to the use of force and even armed attacks, in order to establish a framework in which
cyber operations become cyber warfare. Following that, significant challenges will be elaborated,
such as the answers that the international law has (or does not have), the scholarly response to those
challenges, and how it could affect the future in which cyber warfare is routinely employed. This
chapter will also focus on the permissible measures that the attacked states can employ against cyber
attacks.
After finalizing the substantial discussion in chapter three, chapter four will suggest some
operative solutions to overcome some of the challenges that the cyber warfare poses to the jus ad
bellum. This chapter will offer some atypical perspectives on some of the issues that this thesis
raises, as well as discuss some of the prevalent criticism toward the policy making and governing of
cyber warfare within the current international legal borders.
In chapter five, the research will be concluded with a suggestion of a number of possible
solutions to the challenges discussed in this thesis. This chapter will also contain some insights as
to where cyber warfare is currently going, and whether the international legal norms governing the
right to resort to force are likely to catch up with the rapid development of this new technology that
completely changes and re-defines the battlefield.
2. characterization oF the cyBersPace BattleField
Nowadays, cyberspace has some unique characteristics that distinguish it from the traditional,
physical, kinetic battlefield. Understanding those characteristics is moving one step forward toward
identifying the challenges that cyber warfare poses to the jus ad bellum because those characteristics
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are nonexistent in the world of the kinetic warfare.
2.1. national dePendency and interconnectedness
Given the technological advantages, the tendency of states today to use electronic networks
to base their ‘critical infrastructure’ is rapidly growing. This infrastructure generally consists of
vital services, such as telecommunication, finance, transportation, energy and more.14 Markets
and governments depend greatly on those critical information infrastructures, and it is undisputed
that nations today cannot function without those infrastructures.15 The sensitivity of critical
infrastructure could cause enormous damage when systems are disrupted, as well as affect networks
of other sectors indirectly.16 More importantly, the military highly depends upon electronic
networks, mainly for communication and logistics.17 Moreover, today cyber infrastructure is globally
and domestically interconnected, which in turn prevents the distinction between the military and
civilian infrastructure, making it difficult to isolate a specific cyber target, and subsequently causing
uncertainty as to the scope of the damage that will be the result of the cyber attack eventually.
2.2. anonymity
One of the factors that characterizes cyberspace is the anonymity of its users. Not only is
cyberspace usually used anonymously, it is also possible for perpetrators to evade identification
by sophisticated manners, such as proxy,18 which masks the identity of the actual perpetrator, or
simply by using computer in another uninvolved state, which causes confusion and false perpetrator
identification by the victim state. Physical evidence, visibility and the intent of the perpetrator are all
elements of anonymity, which differentiate the cyberspace battlefield from the physical one. Firstly,
physical evidence exists in the physical battlefield, by means of the kinetic weapon used, the physical
damage caused by that weapon, the intelligence that binds a specific perpetrator to the event, and
more. However, in the cyberspace, there is a far lower to nonexistent amount of physical evidence
and, at times, gathering such evidence is extremely challenging. Secondly, the intent and motivation
are usually apparent from the investigation of a physical kinetic incident, while a cyber attack
remains in most cases ‘silent’ with regard to the intent.
2.3. simPlicity, Quickness and ease oF entry
Unlike war in the physical realm, cyberspace allows actions to be taken in fairly simple and
quick ways. While physical actions require physical preparations, including troops, weaponry and
14 See georg kerschischnig, cyBerthreats and international law 7 (2012).
15 See Branscomb Lewis and Mayer-Schonberger Viktor (eds.), Protecting Our Future - Shaping Public-Private Cooperation to
Secure Critical Information Infrastructures, Report of a Roundtable of Experts and Policy Makers, 5 (May, 2006), available at
http://www.vmsweb.net/attachments/pdf/Protecting-Report.pdf.
16 See kerschischnig, supra note 14.
17 See id. at 8.
18 See id. at 9.
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a precise military plan, cyber attacks—apart from preparing the specific plan or malware—only
require, at their most unsophisticated form, a click of a mouse. Physical actions are also limited by
their swiftness to a certain degree. For example, State A sends fighter jets to attack; State A is still
bound by the fighter jets’ speed limit and physical capabilities. On the other hand, cyber attacks can
happen instantaneously, despite the geographical distance. Those factors are shaping a new system
of conducting war, allowing the weak states that were unable to afford enormous military expenses
to engage in a relatively cheap, simple and quick scheme for waging a war.19 Moreover, the relative
ease of entry brings a diversity of players. While the core idea of sovereignty is that states have
the exclusive right to exercise power, cyberspace remains a realm that no entity exclusively owns.
This difference demonstrates that states are not the only players anymore, and that the cyberspace
includes non-state actors as well.
The high dependency of governmental infrastructures in cyberspace, the anonymity that the
cyberspace encompasses, and the simplicity of the cyberspace altogether reflect the uniqueness of
cyberspace as opposed to the traditional instruments of warfare. The research question and the
necessary terms that are prevalent in this area of international law are then further examined.
3. deFining the research Question, terminology, Jus ad Bellum and the tallinn manual
Cyber operations in inter-state relations raise many difficult questions in different branches of
international law. There is an extensive scholarship dealing with many of those questions, including
how cyber warfare challenges the norms of the jus in bello, theft of intellectual property, cyber
crimes, cyber espionage, and several others. However, all these challenging questions are not part of
the research in this thesis, although many of the principles used to justify a solution to that challenge
or another also apply to the challenges of the jus ad bellum. The primary issue that this thesis intends
to thoroughly analyze and evaluate is the way cyber warfare—defined in subsequent chapters—
challenges the contemporary rules that govern the use of force, namely jus ad bellum, and how the
Tallinn Manual helps or complicates the reconciliation of those challenges.
The presumption of this thesis is that at the time that customary international norms governing
the use of force were crystallized, and when the UN Charter was drafted following the Second
World War, the Internet did not exist, and obviously cyber warfare was not accounted for.20 There
is an ongoing debate among scholars as to whether cyber warfare is fundamentally distinct from
the traditional one, for the purposes of the applicability of the international law on cyber warfare,
and whether the difference between the two would call for a new legal framework or the existing
international law would then suffice, in case such a distinction existed.21 Prominent scholars are
using different considerations to establish their arguments, from pure legal considerations (relating
to existing international law norms) to strategic considerations, which take into account some of
the distinct characteristics of cyber warfare. Needless to mention, the range of arguments and
19 See Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 caliF. l. rev. 817, 842 (2012).
20 See Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-Defense, 32 B. c. int’l & comP.
l. rev. 439, 454 (2009).
21 See, e.g. dinniss, supra note 7, at 28.

96

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 5, No. 1

conclusions is relatively diverse, as far as cyber warfare is concerned. However, it is quite undisputed
that some general principles of the jus ad bellum and the law of armed conflicts are applicable to
cyber warfare, yet even the supporters of the view that current rules and general principles are
capable of regulating cyber warfare agree that there are normative gaps in the currently governing
rules of an armed conflict.22
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze both the contemporary governing rules regulating the
use of force and their possible applicability to cyber warfare–lex lata-and the optimal rules that could
fill the gaps and eliminate the gross challenges that the governing rules pose to the concept of cyber
warfare—lex ferenda.
In order for the research question to be successfully analyzed and answered in this thesis, the
methodology employed would be summed up in the following points: (1) laying down the definition
of the fundamental terms used in the cyber warfare scholarship, as well as determining the specific
characteristics of cyber attacks, which distinguish it from the traditional kinetic warfare; (2) analyzing
the norms of the contemporary jus ad bellum in general; (3) locating the challenges that cyber warfare
poses to the norms of the jus ad bellum and evaluating those in the light of the provisions set forth in
the Tallinn Manual; (4) combining the concept of cyber warfare with the norms of the contemporary
jus ad bellum, analyzing cyber warfare in the light of the prohibition on the use of force, as well as its
exceptions and discussing the challenges from different scholarly perspectives; (5) proposing viable
solutions and interpretations of international law to deal with cyber warfare; and (6) concluding
that which has been answered, and that which has been left undetermined, for more research in the
future, by state practice or a further establishment of legal frameworks.
3.1. the tallinn manual
The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (hereinafter the ‘Tallinn
Manual’) provides the international law—primarily the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello—applicable
to cyber warfare. The Tallinn Manual is an initiative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(hereinafter ‘NATO’) Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn,
Estonia. The Tallinn Manual was published in 2012, and it is a non-binding set of rules, which was
unanimously agreed upon by the group of experts assigned to draft the Tallinn Manual.
The Tallinn Manual consists of black-letter rules and a commentary for each rule presented. The
rules reflect—according to the Manual—lex lata and not lex ferenda. Each rule reflects the consensus
among the Group of Experts. Each rule is followed by a commentary that explains the legal basis of
the rule, its practical implications, and necessary clarifications of the rule. Some commentaries also
reflect the disagreement among the Experts. The Group of Experts consists of both academics and
practitioners in the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello from different NATO member states. Some of
the most reputable and authoritative experts in the Tallinn Manual are Prof. Michael Schmitt, Prof.
Eric Jensen, and others. The work of the Experts drafting the Tallinn Manual was observed by the
Allied Command Transformation, US Cyber Command and the International Committee of the Red
Cross. The draft of the Tallinn Manual was peer-reviewed by other thirteen independent international
22 See id.
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law experts.
The location in which the Tallinn Manual was drafted is not coincidental. In 2007, Estonia was
a victim of a series of cyber attacks. The nature of the attacks being inter-state—rather than intrastate—spurred the legal debate on the international law that governs those inter-state cyber attacks.
A dispute over the removal of a war memorial in Estonia triggered the cyber attacks against the
country, which were at the time traced to Russia, although the latter refuted such claims.
The methodology employed in the Tallinn Manual was to apply and interpret existing
international law, rather than create a specific new international law to regulate cyber warfare. Many
provisions of the Tallinn Manual are based on the existing customary international law, treaties and
judgments. However, even with regard to some existing fundamental customary international law
norms, certain experts were ambivalent, as to whether those apply to cyber warfare at all.
The provisions in the Tallinn Manual can be divided into three main categories. First category
rules are an explicit and direct application of international treaty or customary law (e.g., Rule 13
provides for self-defense against an armed attack). Second category rules are an elaboration of
existing international law (e.g., Rule 11 provides the definition of use of force by offering a scholarly
view of the definition). The third category of rules is the smallest, but it is worth mentioning
nevertheless, and lists the rules that do not have an explicit origin in international law (e.g., Rule 7
poses an evidentiary burden, but is not claimed to have an origin in an international law norm). The
classification into categories demonstrates the difficulty in accepting all of the rules provided by the
Tallinn Manual; therefore, a close individual examination and analysis is required.
Many challenges arise in many of the Tallinn Manual rules, in some rules more than others. The
scope of this thesis is to evaluate the main challenges of the jus ad bellum in cyber warfare, in the
light of the Tallinn Manual’s provisions dealing with the jus ad bellum.
3.2. deFining and distinguishing terminology
The extensive and diverse research, with regard to cyber warfare has generated countless
terms to precisely articulate different actions used in the cyberspace. Some of those researches
did not manage to accurately distinguish between one form and another of cyber action. Many of
the researchers did not deem the terminology sacred in their writings. In order for this thesis to
accurately differentiate between the various concepts and natures of cyber actions, this chapter will
try to define the prevalent terminology in the cyber warfare research field.
3.2.1. comPuter network attack (cna)
Computer network attacks are “[a]ctions taken through the use of computer networks to
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the
computers and networks themselves.”23 Computer network attack captures a wide range of hostile

23 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, (Nov. 8 2010) (as amended
through 31 January 2011).
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actions with the use of a computer code.24 When the definition of the CNA is closely examined, it
is revealed that this definition—despite capturing both—does not distinguish between a politically
motivated CNA and non-politically motivated one. For the purposes of analyzing cyber warfare, the
politically motivated CNAs are the ones of the most significance. Although NATO approved the
definition set forth by the U.S. Department of Defense, it added, “A computer network attack is a
type of cyber attack.”25 Interestingly, the NATO’s Glossary of Terms does not define “cyber attack,”
but it could be that the NATO’s purpose of adding that a CNA is a type of cyber attack was to
include a political purpose in the definition of CNA. This will be further discussed in this chapter,
in the definition of “cyber attack”.
3.2.2. cyBer crime
Cyber crime is understood as committing a crime with the use of a computer.26 Unlike other
terms, cyber crime lacks a generally accepted definition: “[T]here is still no accepted definition of
what really constitutes cybercrime.”27 For the purposes of this thesis, cyber crime would involve
the usage of a computer by non-state actors and in violation of criminal law.28 Therefore, it seems
that cyber crime is not part of the terminology in the subject of this thesis, as it fails to capture the
potential violations of the international law governing the use of force.
3.2.3. cyBer attack
Cyber attack is defined by the Tallinn Manual in rule 30 (supra page 7).29 This definition of a
cyber attack also seems to be adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter:
ICRC).30 In addition, some scholars have made an effort to come up with their own unique
definitions.31 Yet, cyber attack appears to be a more suitable term for the analysis of the jus ad bellum
and cyber warfare.
3.2.4. cyBer warFare
Cyber warfare is not defined in the Tallinn Manual, despite being regularly used throughout the
Manual. With regard to the definition, the Manual mentions, “[T]he term ‘cyber warfare’ is used
here in a purely descriptive, non-normative sense.”32 The definition of the term is also absent
24 See dinniss, supra note 7, at 5.
25 N. Atl. Treaty Org. [NATO], NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, at 2-C-12 (AAP-6) (2010).
26 The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 19, at 18.
27 sylvia mecado kierkegaard, International Cybercrime Convention, in cyBer warFare and cyBer terrorism 469, (IGI
Global 2008), available at http://www.igi-global.com/viewtitlesample.aspx?id=7486.
28 The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 19, at 18.
29 Tallin Manual, supra note 10, at §30.
30 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, What Limits Does the Law of War Impose on Cyber Attacks? (June 2013), https://www.
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/130628-cyber-warfare-q-and-a-eng.htm.
31 See, e.g. The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 19, at 10.
32 Tallin Manual, supra note 10, at 4, n. 17.
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from the glossary.33 The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations
defined cyber warfare as: “An armed conflict conducted in whole or part by cyber means. Military
operations conducted to deny an opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and
weapons in a conflict. It includes cyber attack, cyber defense and cyber enabling actions.”34
It seems that contrasting cyber attack from cyber warfare would be equivalent to contrasting
the use of force or an armed attack from war, while international law does not propose a binding
definition of the term ‘war.’35 The definition of cyber attack and cyber warfare differ in the fact that
cyber attack focuses on the gravity, amounting presumably to the use of force or an armed attack,
while cyber warfare is a more general term, which focuses on the instrumental nature of such a war,
and is used to define the conduct of war by the usage of cyber means, either wholly or partially.
One definition of cyber warfare is “actions taken by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s
computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.”36
3.2.5. cyBersPace oPerations
Cyberspace operations—also known as Cyber operations—are defined by the Tallinn Manual as
“the employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or by the
use of cyberspace.”37 The Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations used a similar definition.38
For purposes of uniformity throughout this thesis, the term ‘cyber attack’ will be used to address
a single incident in the cyberspace with effects that arguably amount to the use of force or an armed
attack. The term ‘cyber warfare’ will be used to address the general concept of the conduct of
war with the means of cyberspace. The remainder of terms defined in this chapter will be used in
citations and when a nuanced term is required for a better understanding of a specific concept.
The contemporary jus ad bellum will be discussed in the following chapter, in order to understand
the legal framework that cyber warfare might be operating in.
3.3. the contemPorary norms oF Jus ad Bellum
3.3.1. ProhiBition on the use oF Force and selF-deFense
Jus ad bellum—latin for “the right for war”—is the set of international law norms, which
determines the time when it is lawful for states to resort to force.39 Historically, the international law
on the use of force has been constantly changing throughout the years, from the use of force that
33 Id. at 258.
34 deP’t oF deF., Joint chieFs oF staFF, Joint terminology For cyBersPace oPerations, available at http://www.
nsci-va.org/CyberReferenceLib/2010-11-joint%20Terminology%20for%20Cyberspace%20Operations.pdf.
35 See yoram dinstein, war, aggression and selF-deFence 4 (5th ed., 2011).
36 richard clarke, roBert knake, cyBer war – the next threat to national security and what to do
aBout it 6 (2010).
37 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at 258.
38 See Joint terminology For cyBersPace oPerations, supra note 34, at §16.
39 See Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 stan. l. & Pol’y rev. (forthcoming) 9 (2014).
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required “just cause” in order to be permissible (jus bellum iustum), to use of force that was always
permissible, and eventually to the unsuccessful attempt of absolute ban on war in the Covenant
of the League of Nations and the Kellog-Briand Pact. As of today, the jus ad bellum is addressed
in the UN Charter and by some customary international law principles. It primarily consists of a
general prohibition on the threat or the use of force, embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter:
“all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.”40
According to the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua judgment, the prohibition on
the use of force is part of the customary international law.41 Evidence to the prohibition on the
use of force being part of customary international law can also be found in the Declaration on the
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter: ‘Friendly Relations Declaration’),
which reaffirmed the duty of states to refrain from using or threatening to use force in their
international relations.42 The UN Charter contains two exceptions to the general prohibition on the
use of force, being Security Council authorization to enact forcible measures as part of Article 42
and self-defense as prescribed in Article 51:
[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.43
Interpreting some of the key terms ingrained in both the general prohibition on the use of force
and the exception self-defense is complex. The Charter does not provide a definition of the term
‘force’—neither did the International Court of Justice or the General Assembly.44 The term ‘armed
attack’ is characterized by the same ambiguity, although the International Court of Justice had—
to some extent—addressed the term, as will be discussed below. The interpretational measures
are explained in Article 31 and 32 in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter:
40 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
41 See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 188-90.
42 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations (Declaration), G.A. Res. 25/2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
43 U.N. Charter art. 51.
44 See dinniss, supra note 7, at 40.
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VCLT), which prescribed, inter alia, interpretational methods with regard to treaties.45 Article 31(1)
posits, “[A] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”46 Most
experts agree that interpreting the terms “force” and “armed attack” in their ordinary meanings can
be challenging, and point to the Charter’s preamble and the Purposes of the United Nations in order
to identify the “context.”47 One of those purposes, as mentioned in the preamble, is to ensure “that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”48 Article 1 adds that the purpose of
the United Nations is, among others, to “maintain international peace and security.”49 It appears
that the preamble of the Charter establishes a goal to prevent the use of the armed force in interstate relations. However, the general prohibition in Article 2(4) of the Charter does not indicate
that the prohibition is on the “armed” force.50 In case the interpretation employed with accordance
to Article 31 of the VCLT leaves an ambiguous or obscure meaning, Article 32 to the VCLT
establishes the resort to supplementary means of interpretation, namely “preparatory work of the
treaty”, better known as “travaux préparatoires”.51 At the time of the drafting of the Charter, the
proposal of the Brazilian delegation to include economic coercion, within the general prohibition
of Article 2(4), was rejected by a majority vote of 26 against 2.52 It is therefore widely believed that
the scope of the prohibition on the use of force covers the armed force, and excludes the political
or economic coercion.53 According to the analysis supra, escalation in diplomatic relations, the
worsening of trade policies, sanctions and boycotts are not per se prohibited by Article 2(4) to the
Charter,54 unless they are carried out by the use of force.55
The prohibition on the use of force mentions that the prohibited use of force would be one
that is “against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state.” A restrictive
reading of Article 2(4) would allow the use of force, which is neither against territorial integrity
nor political independence, e.g. humanitarian intervention.56 However, the prevailing perspective
on the scope of the prohibition is that it also prohibits the use of force that is “in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” As mentioned before, one of the
purposes of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security and encourage pacific resolutions
of disputes.57 Therefore, the prohibition on the use of force as set forth in Article 2(4) to the
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties §31-32, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “VCLT”].
46 Id. at §31(1).
47 See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 904 (1999) [hereinafter “CNA and the Use of Force”].
48 U.N. Charter preamble.
49 U.N. Charter art. 1., para. 1.
50 See CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 904.
51 VCLT, supra note 45, at §32
52 See CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 905.
53 See id. at 908.
54 See kerschischnig, supra note 14, at 106.
55 See Paul Szasz, The Law of Economic Sanctions, 71 U.S. naval c. int’l l. stud.: the law oF armed conFlict into
the next millennium 455, 455-56 (1998).
56 See kerschischnig, supra note 14, at 107.
57 See id. at 108.
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Charter is interpreted broadly to cover all threats and uses of force (armed), unless the use of force
is exercised with accordance to the exceptions to the general prohibition (i.e., Security Council
authorization under Chapter VII, or as explained below, under the exception of self-defense).
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the ‘inherent right’ of self-defense. Similarly to the
prohibition on the use of force, the International Court of Justice has affirmed the customary
nature of the right to self-defense.58 Article 51 also requires that “an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations” in order to trigger the right to self-defense. Similarly to the
discussion on the vague meaning of ‘force’ within Article 2(4) of the Charter, the term ‘armed
attack’ is in no way any easier to define.
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice made an attempt to characterize an
‘armed attack,’ stating, “[I]t will be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force
(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.”59 In the same case, the Court
proceeded to establish the ‘scale and effects’ test that would distinguish an armed attack from a mere
frontier incident, which is not an armed attack.60 According to the prevalent perspective and the
Nicaragua judgment, there is a gap between the ‘use of force’ and an ‘armed attack.’61 An ‘armed
attack’ poses a higher severity threshold than the ‘use of force,’ while a less severe and grave incident
that amounts to the ‘use of force’ and not reaching the ‘armed attack’ threshold does not trigger the
right to self defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter.62 This view was confirmed in the
International Court of Justice Oil Platforms case.63 According to the Institut de Droit International, “an
armed attack triggering the right to self-defence must be of a certain degree of gravity,” and “[a]cts
involving the use of force of lesser intensity may give rise to counter-measures in conformity with
international law.”64
Definitions of the terms ‘force’ and ‘armed attack,’ out of the cyber context, remain ambiguous.
The meaning of those terms will be better understood when their applicability to cyber attacks will
be examined in subsequent chapters.
Both the prohibition on the use of force and the right to self-defense were unanimously applied
to cyber warfare in the Tallinn Manual. Rule 10 of the Tallinn Manual applies Article 2(4) of the UN
58 See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 176.
59 Id. at ¶191.
60 Id. at ¶195.
61 See dinstein, supra note 35, at 207
62 See id. at 209.
63 See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/9715.pdf.
64 Institut de Droit Int’l, Tenth Commission: Present Problems of the Use of Armed Forces in International Law, Res. 10A (Oct.
27, 2007), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2007_san_02_en.pdf. The ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility of 2001 also acknowledge that in Article 22: “The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity
with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a
countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with chapter II of part three.” In addition, Article 49 of the
Draft Articles provides that “[a]n injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for
an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations under part two.” Article 50(1)
(a) reaffirm that “the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations.”.
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Charter, as is, to cyber warfare, and reads as follows: “A cyber operation that constitutes a threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or that is in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, is unlawful.”65 Similarly, Article
51 of the UN Charter is applied, as well in Rule 13.66
Although Article 51 does not explicitly say so, an armed attack is not the only condition that
establishes the right to self-defense.67 In order for a state to invoke the right to self-defense when
‘an armed attack occurs’ against it, there are several customary international law requirements that
must be fulfilled with regard to self-defense.
3.3.2. necessity and ProPortionality
A state engaging in self-defense must ascertain that the use of force in response to an armed
attack is necessary and proportionate to the original armed attack. The meaning of necessity is that
the victim state must first weigh a resolution of the conflict by non-forcible measures, and if those
are available in response to the armed attack.68 Non-forcible measures may include diplomacy, law
enforcement or sanctions. In other words, forcible self-defense should be practiced only as a last
resort, when a pacific resolution of the conflict is unavailable, and thus the use of force in response
to the armed attack is necessary.69
Once the self-defense response is deemed necessary, it must be shown that such forcible
response is proportionate. The principle of proportionality governs both the jus ad bellum and the
jus in bello.70 In the jus ad bellum context, proportionality has a quantitative and functional meaning.71
The quantitative aspect of proportionality requires that the scale and effect of the counter-force
must be similar to the armed attack.72 The functional aspect requires that the use of force in selfdefense be proportional to the objective of repelling the armed attack.73 It is important to note,
however, that the proportionality requirement does not limit the method—whether kinetic or
cyber—that a victim state employs to repel an armed attack, but rather its intensity (scale and effect).
Following the 1837 Caroline incident, Secretary of State Daniel Webster made the famous
statement with regard to ‘necessity’, by claiming that a state engaging in self-defense must
demonstrate “necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment of deliberation.”74 With regard to proportionality, it was established that “since the
act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it.”75 The International Court of Justice reaffirmed in several cases that both necessity and
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at §10.
See id. at §13, 54-61.
See kerschischnig, supra note 14, at 119.
See dinstein, supra note 35, at 232.
See id.
See id. at 233.
See Sheng Li, When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, 38 yale J. int’l l. 179, 208 (2013).
See kerschischnig, supra note 14, at 117, 120.
See When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, supra note 71, at 208.
r.y. Jennings et al., oPPenheim’s international law 420 (9th ed., 1996)
R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod cases, 32 am. J. int’l l. 82, 89 (1938).
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proportionality are prerequisites to invoke the right to self-defense. In Nicaragua, the International
Court of Justice mentioned that necessity and proportionality are not embodied within the language
of Article 51, and nevertheless, “self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional
to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international
law.”76 The International Court of Justice repeated the same idea in the Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,77 the Oil Platforms case,78 and the Armed Activities case.79
3.3.3. immediacy
A state responding in self-defense must do so within a reasonable timeframe.80 The requirement
of immediacy does not imply that self-defense must take place the instant an armed attack occurs,
or minutes after that.81 Preparing the armed forces and executing the self-defense cannot usually be
immediate.82
3.3.4. anticiPatory selF deFense - imminence
Whether anticipatory self-defense (or preemptive self-defense) is permissible under international
law is highly debatable.83 While the majority of states hold the view that anticipatory self-defense
is a prohibited use of force,84 the U.S. Operational Law Handbook mentions that self-defense could be
employed against “hostile intent.”85 The U.S. policy on anticipatory self-defense is frequently called
the ‘Bush Doctrine.’86 Supporters of the right to anticipatory self-defense rely on the requirement
of ‘imminence’ of the threat:87
[W]here there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and
potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an
armed attack may be said to have begun to occur though it has not
passed the frontier… If… the attack becomes manifestly imminent
then it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel
a defending State to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps

76 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶94.
77 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 226, 245 (Jul. 8, 1996).
78 Iran, 2003 I.C.J. at 198.
79 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 136, 223 (Dec. 19, 2005).
80 dinstein, supra note 35, at 262, 267.
81 Id.
82 kerschischnig, supra note 14, at 117.
83 See christine d. gray, international law and the use oF Force 160 (3rd ed., 2008).
84 See id.
85 United States Army, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook, 86 (2007).
86 Preemptive Action in Self-Defense: National Security Strategy, 2001 digest §x, at 947.
87 avra constantinou, the right oF selF-deFense under customary international law and article 51 oF the
un charter 115 (2000).
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fatal blow. 88
First, the conditions to use anticipatory self-defense are that the potential attacker has the
capability to conduct the attack, or be on the verge of acquiring the capability.89 Second, the
anticipatory self-defense must only be used as the window of opportunity closes.90
3.3.5. attriBution
A state engaging in self-defense measures must first identify the state responsible for the armed
attack.91 The assumption of State responsibility international law is that a state can be held liable
if the illegal acts or omission were conducted on behalf of the state by a state organ, or if the state
instructed, gave directions or controlled the non-state entity.92
The International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua concluded that in order for a
responsibility to be imputed upon a state, it must have ‘effective control’ over the perpetrators:
United States participation… in the financing, organizing, training,
supplying and equipping of the contras… is still insufficient in itself,
on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the
purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by
the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations
in Nicaragua… For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of
the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that
State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in
the course of which the alleged violations were committed. (Emphasis
added).93
On the contrary, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia reached a
different test of attribution in the Tadić case.94 The court in this case took the view that an ‘overall
control’ of a state over an organization would satisfy the attribution requirement. The overall
control test is broader in its scope and more permissive in its nature, as the court noted, “If it is
under the overall control of a State, it must perforce engage the responsibility of that State for its
activities, whether or not each of them was specifically imposed, requested or directed by the State.”95 However, in
88 Claude H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 1952 II recueil des
cours 451, 496-98.
89 See Quo Vadis, supra note 39, at 14.
90 See id.
91 See Levi Grosswald, Cyber Attack Attribution Matters under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 35 Brook. J. int’l l. 1151,
1153 (2011).
92 See When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, supra note 71, at 203.
93 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 64-5, 115.
94 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case no. IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment (Jul. 15, 1999).
95 Id. at 122.
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2007, well after the Nicaragua and Tadić judgments were rendered, the International Court of Justice
in the Bosnia Genocide case rejected the Tadić overall control test by saying that ‘the “overall control”
test is unsuitable because it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection that must
exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international responsibility.96 In this case, the
International Court of Justice used the Nicaragua effective control to resolve the question of State
responsibility.
Dinstein includes attribution as part of necessity.97 Dinstein posits, “[I]t is incumbent on the
State invoking self-defence to establish in a definite manner that an armed attack was launched by a
particular country against which it is forcibly responding, and by no other State.”98
Articles 8, 9, and 11 to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts are generally referred to as the authority on State responsibility attribution
framework.99 A hostile act conducted by a person or a group is attributable to a state when: (1)
the person or the group is acting under the direction or control of that state; (2) the person or the
group is exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official
authorities and in circumstances, such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority; or
(3) when the conduct is not attributable to a state with accordance to Articles 8 and 9, when the
state acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question.
It appears from the draft articles that the Tadić overall control test was not incorporated in
those three articles, and that the effective control test is the governing test to determine State
responsibility.
3.3.6. less grave Forms oF cyBer oPerations
Cyber operations that cannot be classified as armed attacks or use of force are not part of the
jus ad bellum paradigm. Such cyber operations may qualify as interventions violating the principle
of non-intervention.100 In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice noted that intervention is
prohibited if it is:
…[b]earing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the
principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the
choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the
formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses
methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain
free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms
the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in
96 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 406 (Feb. 26).
97 dinstein, supra note 35, at 231.
98 Id.
99 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (adopted by the International Law
Commission at its fifty-third session) (2001), §8-9, 11.
100 See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 108, 202.
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the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form
of military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or
terrorist armed activities within another State. 101
The principle was also recognized in the Friendly Relations Declaration102 and in the Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
their Independence and Sovereignty.103 The meaning of the principle of non-intervention to cyber
operations is that when it is coercive, it is violating the prohibition of intervention. In order to
violate the principle of non-intervention, a cyber attack must interfere with the right of states to
freely conduct their internal and external affairs. The non-intervention principle is somewhat similar
to the use of force prohibition. However, the non-intervention principle also encompasses acts of
lesser gravity that do not reach the use of force threshold, and not all cyber operations would be
coercive. For instance, cyber espionage does not coerce a state in its political, economic, social or
cultural system’s free choices.
3.3.6.1. countermeasures
A possible response to an act of prohibited intervention (that does not reach the armed
attack threshold) is countermeasures. Countermeasures are a form of unilateral, non-forcible selfhelp employed by an injured state in response to internationally wrongful acts by another state.104
Countermeasures are illegal, unless they are employed in response to the wrongful act.105 There
are several limitation to the permissible countermeasures and the way in which they are allowed to
be carried out, however, countermeasures in cyber warfare require a whole separate discussion and
research. Needless to say that countermeasures are outside of the jus ad bellum analysis.
We move to the substantial discussion on the challenges of the jus ad bellum in the context of
cyber warfare.
4. identiFication oF the technical and suBstantive Jus ad Bellum challenges
oF cyBer warFare
After viewing the definitions, characteristics and the relevant contemporary jus ad bellum, it is
time to proceed to the core of this thesis – namely, the challenges that cyber warfare poses to the
101 Id.
102 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 42.
103 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their
Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965).
104 Katharine Hinkle, Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More Thing to Worry About, 37 yale J. int’l l. online
11, 14 (2011); see also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries,
in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d sess., Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, pt. 3, ch. II, ¶¶ 1, 3, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/
Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_2001_v2_p2_e.pdf.
105 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 99, at §22.
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jus ad bellum given its unique characteristics and vulnerabilities. Analyzing the challenges would be
irrelevant if cyber attacks are unable to amount to the ‘use of force’ or ‘armed attack’; therefore, the
primary question is whether cyber attacks have the capability to reach the threshold of the ‘use of
force’ or ‘armed attack.’
4.1. international law amBiguity
Customary international norms have not developed, with regard to cyber warfare. Also, there
is not any specific treaty (or making thereof) to govern cyber warfare.106 There is ambiguity as to
whether the current jus ad bellum applies, under what conditions the use of force invokes the right
of self-defense, and how the right of self-defense is limited in cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual is a
NATO initiated project to reflect the international law governing cyber warfare, according to the
Group of Experts who drafted the rules in the Manual.107 The Group of Experts was naturally
chosen from the NATO member countries, most prominently from the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Western Europe. Considering the identity of the experts and the possible perspective
bias, it is questionable to what extent the Tallinn Manual represents an international perspective on
the international law applicable to cyber warfare.
To illustrate this controversy, two separate governmental initiatives were undertaken by the
United States and Russia-China to understand the scope of the international law applicable to
cyber attacks.108 Unsurprisingly, the two initiatives reached absolutely different conclusions.109
While according to the United States a cyber attack is “a hostile act using computer . . . intended
to disrupt . . . critical cyber systems,”110 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization took a broader
view, defining “information war” as an act of state to impair another state’s “political, economic
and social systems.”111 The two perspectives represent a core question, regarding the types of
coercions covered by the use of force paradigm. There is an ongoing debate as to whether political
and economic coercions are covered by the scope of the use of force paradigm. The Tallinn Manual
explicitly notes that “whatever ‘force’ may be, it is not mere economic or political coercion.”112
It is also important to note that the ambiguity is limited in its scope. For example, the view that
international law applicable to cyber warfare should be created from zero is not very prevalent in the
academic discourse. The White House Strategy for Cyberspace summarizes the primary challenge of
cyber warfare, stating:
The development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not
require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render
106 See Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at 5.
107 See id.
108 See The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 19, at 824.
109 See id.
110 Joint terminology For cyBersPace oPerations, supra note 34, at §10.
111 Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet As An ‘Information Weapon’, NPR (Sep. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=130052701.
112 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at 46.
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existing international norms obsolete Long-standing international
norms guiding state behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also
apply in cyberspace Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked
technology require additional work to clarify how these norms apply
and what additional understandings might be necessary to supplement
them We will continue to work internationally to forge consensus
regarding how norms of behavior apply to cyberspace, with the
understanding that an important first step in such efforts is applying
the broad expectations of peaceful and just interstate conduct to
cyberspace. 113
The White House’s statement is precise in delimiting the scope of this thesis. On one hand,
some norms of international law apply to cyber warfare, without any specific difficulties. On the
other hand, some points still require careful consideration and creation of lex specialis to deal with
cyber warfare’s distinctiveness. The EU Commission also shares this view; in its Internet Policy and
Governance draft, it concludes that cyberspace is “subject to the same laws and norms that apply in
other areas of our day-to-day lives.”114
4.2. cyBer attacks as armed coercion
Since the drafters of the UN Charter were not foreseeing that wars could be conducted in the
cyberspace,115 the question that appears to be highly arguable among scholars is the applicability of
the jus ad bellum, as promulgated, inter alia, in Article 2(4) and 51 to the UN Charter on cyber attacks.
Three approaches have been presented by scholars as to whether a cyber attack could constitute an
armed attack, namely the instrument-based approach, the target-based approach, and the effectsbased approach.116
4.2.1. the instrument-Based aPProach
As the name suggests, the instrument-based approach focuses on the coercive instrument
used.117 Traditionally, the paradigm of the use of force was based on the instrument-based
approach.118 In order for an attack to qualify as an armed attack, the weapon employed must be of
a kinetic nature. Weapons that would qualify under this approach would be traditional weapons, such
as conventional weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear ones. The instrument113 The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World 9 (2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.
114 European Commission on Internet Policy and Governance, available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/
rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-72-EN-F1-1.Pdf.
115 See When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, supra note 71, at 186.
116 See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. nat’l security l. & Pol’y 87, 91 (2010).
117 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 909.
118 Id.
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based approach analyzes whether the destructive physical damage resulted from the kinetic force
of the weapon used.119 The advantage of the instrument-based approach is predictability, given the
simplicity in which only the assessment as to whether a kinetic weapon has been used is required.120
Article 41 of the UN Charter provides further support to the notion the cyber attacks could
not meet the ‘armed attack’ threshold. Article 41 reads, “[T]he Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions … These
may include … telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication.”121 (Emphasis added).
Under this approach, diplomatic or economic coercions would be classified as interventions,
while military coercion would satisfy the threshold of the use of force and armed attack.122
Therefore, cyber attacks would seldom reach the threshold of military coercion, and hence, rarely
constitute an “armed attack.”123 Most scholars today do not hold the view that the instrument-based
approach applies to cyber attacks.124 However, it is important to note that most scholars today reject
the instrument-based approach, due to being “dangerously outdated.”125 Yet, this was the approach
used since the promulgation of the UN Charter.126
4.2.2. the target-Based aPProach
The target-based approach posits that any cyber attack against critical cyber infrastructure is
an armed attack.127 This approach disregards the gravity of the attack and focuses on the target of
the cyber attack that would justify a forcible response by the victim state, namely a strict liability
regime.128 According to the target-based analysis, it is more likely for a military escalation to happen
when a cyber attack occurs, given the fact that no kinetic effect is required in order to trigger the
right to self-defense.129
Defining ‘critical infrastructure’ turns to be another complicated task. According to the
UN General Assembly, “critical infrastructures” is described as: “…those used for, inter alia,
the generation, transmission and distribution of energy, air and maritime transport, banking and
financial services, e-commerce, water supply, food distribution and public health—and the critical
information infrastructures that increasingly interconnect and affect their operations.”130
119 Michael Schmitt, “Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context, 4 int’l conFerence
on cyBer conFlict 283, 287 (2012), available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/5_2_Schmitt_
AttackAsATermOfArt.pdf.
120 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 917.
121 U.N. Charter art. 41.
122 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 909.
123 Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 lewis & clark l. rev. 1023,
1041 (2007).
124 See The Law of Cyber-Attack, note 19, at 846
125 See id.
126 See CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 909.
127 walter gary sharP, cyBersPace and the use oF Force 129–30 (1999)
128 See When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, supra note 71, at 186.
129 See The Law of Cyber-Attack, note 19, at 846-7.
130 Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures, G.A.
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The US Patriot Act also defines critical infrastructure as: “…systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.”131
According to the target-based approach, any penetration to those critical infrastructures is an
armed attack, triggering the right to self-defense. Neither the instrument (the cyber attack) nor the
kinetic effect (death or injury) is part of the analysis of the target-based approach.
4.2.3. the eFFects-Based aPProach
Since the instrument-based approach disqualifies many cyber attacks from reaching the armed
attack threshold and the target-based approach is overbroad, a third approach used in the assessment
of whether a cyber attack amounts to an armed one has emerged. The target-based approach—or
the consequence-based approach—was articulated by Michael Schmitt in his renowned article on
Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework.132
The approach was developed in order to deal with the disadvantages of the instrument and targetbased approaches. There are several arguments in support of the effects-based approach. Firstly,
the potential lethal nature of cyber attacks should not be excluded solely on the grounds that the
UN Charter drafters were not aware of the possibility of those attacks in the future.133 Secondly, in
abstract, law is intended, inter alia, to prevent certain outcomes. Therefore, a consequences-based
approach is better suited to prevent severe cyber attacks.134 Dinstein maintains, “[I]t does not matter
what specific means - kinetic or electronic - are used to bring about, but the end result must be that
violence occurs,”135 and several other scholars also support the effects-based approach.136
The consequences of cyber attacks can range from a mere nuisance to physical damage and
death, as well as negative economic and social effects.137 The goal of the effects-based approach
is to characterize a cyber attack on this continuum, and to distinguish between military coercion
cyber attacks and the economic or political ones.138 The criteria are as follows: (1) Severity - the
degree of the physical destruction caused by the cyber attack. Armed coercion tends to cause
greater physical damage. (2) Immediacy - the amount of time elapsed since the attack began and
until the consequences emerged. Armed coercion is more likely to have immediate effects. (3)
Directness - armed coercion usually causes physical damage that can be directly tied to the attack
itself. (4) Invasiveness - the more intrusive the attack is, the higher the chances it is armed coercion.

Res. 58/199, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/199 (Jan. 30, 2004).
131 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e).
132 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47.
133 “Attack” as a Term of Art, supra note 119, at 287.
134 Id.
135 dinstein, supra note 35, at 88.
136 sharP, supra note 127, at 88-93.
137 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 912.
138 See id. at 914.
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Intrusiveness is evaluated by the degree of which the target system is secured.139 (5) Measurability
– the effects caused by armed coercion can be easily measured, while the ones followed by
economic or political coercions are harder to measure. (6) Presumptive Legitimacy - international law
explicitly prohibits the use of (armed) force. If the nature of the attack is not per se prohibited by
international law, it is therefore permitted, and vice versa.
Schmitt’s six-criteria paradigm was incorporated wholly in the Tallinn Manual, as part of Rule 11,
defining the use of force, which reads, “[R]ule 11 - Definition of use of force: A cyber operation
constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to
the level of a use of force.”140 The commentary that accompanies this rule mentions that Schmitt’s
criteria as a method for states “when deciding whether to characterize any operation, including a
cyber operation, as a use of force,” and that the criteria are “merely factors that influence States
making use of force assessment . . . not formal legal criteria.”141 The language of the Tallinn Manual
suggests that Schmitt’s criteria apply to any use of force, regardless of whether a cyber attack was
launched. Moreover, the Tallinn Manual includes two additional criteria to the paradigm: the military
character and state involvement.142 As of the military character, a nexus between the cyber attack in
question and military operations makes it more likely for the attack to be qualified as a use of force
incident, and as of state involvement, the more direct the participation of a state in the cyber attacks
is, the more likely it is a use of force act.143
The criteria paradigm of the effects-based approach can potentially cause obscurity and
unpredictability in assessing whether a cyber attack amounts to the use of force. Given the fact that
the substantial state practice is currently unavailable, the analysis will lead to many gray area cases.144
In addition, the Tallinn Manual claims only to apply existing international law. However, the ‘Schmitt
Criteria’ is viewed by some as an attempt to prescribe a new law.145
The effects-based approach could also be supported by the International Court of Justice,
Nicaragua case, where the court employed a broad interpretation of Article 2(4).146 Moreover, the
court in the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons concluded that the
jus ad bellum applies to “any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.”147 The view of the
court in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion illustrates that the instrument-based approach is not
necessarily the prevalent approach in assessing whether the jus ad bellum applies to a specific weapon.
The court used the same approach with regard to the jus in bello.148
139 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at 49.
140 Id. at 45.
141 Id. at 48.
142 Id. at 50.
143 See id. at 50-51.
144 See CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 919.
145 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at §11, commentary 9 (Although the Tallinn Manual suggests that it applies law “as
is,” the criteria is viewed as an attempt to prescribe new law. One such argument is made by Lianne J.M. Boer, ‘Restating
the Law ‘As It Is’: On the Tallinn Manual and the Use of Force in Cyberspace, 5:3 amsterdam law Forum 4, 6 (2013).).
146 See Quo Vadis, supra note 39, at 9.
147 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 76, at ¶39.
148 Id. at ¶78. The court talked about the “Martens Clause”, which was at first presented in the preamble of Hague
Convention II of 1899, and later used in Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention (Protocol I).
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Moreover, Harold Koh, former legal adviser of the U.S. State Department, in his speech at the
U.S. Cyber Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference on the applicability of international law to
cyberspace, was asked whether ‘cyber activities ever constitute a use of force.’149 Koh responded
positively: “Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would
likely be viewed as a use of force.”150 However, while this is the view of the Department of State,
it is important to understand that different states will not necessarily hold the same views. General
Keith Alexander, a nominee151 for the U.S. Cyber Command said:
There is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use
of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations
may assert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds for
what constitutes a use of force. Thus, whether in the cyber or any
other domain, there is always potential disagreement among nations
concerning what may amount to a threat or use of force. 152
Not only some states oppose the effects-based approach and its criteria, but also some scholars
criticize the Schmitt Criteria on the grounds that it is over inclusive, as Silver notes:
Examination of the criteria suggests that virtually any event of
[computer network attack] can be argued to fall on the armed force
side of the line, except perhaps as regards the criterion of severity, and
that the criterion of severity in effect is just another way of articulating
the observation that, for an event of [computer network attack] to be
considered a type of force under Article 2(4), it must produce personal
injury or property damage similar to that caused by military weapons. 153
On a final note, while the Tallinn Manual intends to reflect the lex lata, rather than the lex ferenda,
with regard to the international law applicable to cyber warfare; it is important to note that the

The purpose of the clause is to apply the jus in bello provisions and customs to cases not explicitly covered by the Geneva
Conventions. The Martens Clause posits that ‘principles of international law derived from established custom, from
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’ to those cases. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, the ICJ affirmed that the Martens Clause ‘proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of
military technology’.
149 Chris Borgen, Harold Koh on International Law in Cyberspace, oPinio Juris (Sep. 19, 2012), http://opiniojuris.
org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace.
150 Id.
151 Keith Alexander was appointed by the U.S. Senate as Cyber Command commander on May 7, 2010. He served as
commander from May 21, 2010 until March 28, 2014.
152 Duncan Hollis, Reading Tea Leaves in Confirmation Hearings for U.S. Cyber Commander, oPinio Juris (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/18/reading-tea-leaves-confirmation-hearings-u-s-cyber-commander.
153 Daniel Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 76 int’l l.
studies 73, 89 (2002).
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‘Tallinn Manual’ does not consider itself a legally binding document.154 Moreover, the effects-based
approach criteria appear in the commentary part, which does not represent the lex lata, and the
Manual explicitly states that the criteria are not legally binding.155 It is unclear whether the criteria
represent the contemporary jus ad bellum, given the fact that it is not part of any primary source of
international law.156 Therefore, we move forward to discuss the legal standing of the effects-based
approach criteria.
4.2.3.1. the legal source oF the eFFects-Based aPProach
The effects-based approach is not provided by the UN Charter or any other international legal
instrument. In the commentary to Rule 11 of the Tallinn Manual on the prohibition of use of force
or threats, the Manual states:
The approach suggests that States are likely to consider and place great
weight on the following factors, inter alia, when deciding whether to
characterize any operation, including a cyber operation, as a use of
force. It must be emphasized that they are merely factors that influence
States making use of force assessments they are not formal legal
criteria.157
Schmitt himself admitted that the criteria were influenced by a policy-oriented approach.158 The
Manual does not intend to cite any international law sources in support of the criteria. It is clear
that the criteria do not represent explicit international law, neither the treaty law nor the customary
one. In addition, the Manual does not create new international law because it lacks the mandate to
do so. The furthest the criteria can go is to represent the “teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations,” as provided in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, which lists the sources of international law to be applied by the Court (and is believed to
represent international law sources overall). However, those teachings can only serve as subsidiary
means to clarify international law. Moreover, despite the fact that the Tallinn Manual has some of
the most qualified and reputable experts, it does not have experts of various nations as suggested in
Article 38 of the Statute. Therefore, the criteria are neither old nor new, in regard to law.
If the Manual informally creates the criteria—in contrast to creating international law—rather
than basing it on existing law, this will raise the question of why exactly those specific criteria were
chosen over others, and what the interaction of the different criteria among themselves is. Some
scholars based the criteria on “intuition,” and provided “[t]his raises the question of why states
would follow these intuitions regarding the factual behavior of states when confronted with normative
154 Quo Vadis, supra note 39, at 2.
155 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at 48, commentary 9.
156 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
157 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at 48, commentary 9.
158 See Michael Schmitt, The “Use of Force” in Cyberspace: A Reply to Dr. Ziolkowski, 4 int’l conFerence on cyBer
conFlict Proceedings 311, 317 (2012).
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questions regarding the scope of application of the prohibition on the use of force.”159 The
criteria could also mean that the drafters of the Tallinn Manual expect states to develop customary
international law along the lines of those criteria.160
It seems that the criteria are not entirely legal, but represent, to some extent, a political view.
However, it seems inconsistent to employ political standards in assessing a legal situation. The use
of force entails State responsibility, and using political standards to hold a state accountable seems
contradictory to the purpose of international law and the law on State responsibility.
4.2.4. cyBer attacks as Political or economic coercion
As discussed above, in order for a cyber attack to qualify as one involving the use of force, it
must cause certain physical destruction or injury or death to persons, and as already mentioned,
Brazil’s proposal to include political and economic coercion in the scope of the use of force was
rejected.161 However, in the age of cyber warfare, economic and political coercion by the use of
code or viruses could be even more destructive than a cyber attack with physical destruction. While
conventional warfare focused on causing physical consequences, cyber warfare is expected to cause
comparable damage with no physical consequences.162 There is a possibility that this gap between
traditional warfare and economic coercion will be exploited in order to avoid State responsibility
for internationally illegal acts.163 Cyber attacks effects range from “mere inconvenience to physical
destruction and death . . . It can affect economic, social, mental and physical well-being, either
directly or indirectly, and its potential scope grows almost daily, being capable of targeting everything
from individual persons or objects to entire societies.”164 One example could be a cyber attack
that shuts down the New York Stock Exchange for a week. While it causes no tangible or visible
damage, it results in the loss of enormous amounts of money, due to the inactivity of the financial
market, as well as collateral damage caused by such inactivity. Some will argue that even though
this damage is not kinetic, i.e. was not caused by an explosive or physical destructive reaction; it
is even more severe than a small physical damage or an injury of a single person. According to
the view that the use of force may only be of an armed nature, a cyber attack on the New York
Stock Exchange will not qualify as an act involving the use of force. Similarly, the cyber attacks
on Estonia that shut down banking websites were not viewed as use of force incidents. Another
comparison to illustrate the anomaly is a limited border incursion, which qualifies as the use of force
under the current interpretation, and the 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo, which is both politically
and economically coercive with consequences that exceed in their severity the consequences of the
incursion.165 Such an anomaly requires reconsidering the scope of the prohibition of the use of
159 Kessler and Werner, Expertise, Uncertainty and International Law: A Study of the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare, 26(4)
leiden J. oF int’l l. 793, 809 (2013).
160 See id.
161 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 905.
162 See Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, supra note 13, at 58.
163 See id.
164 CNA and the Use of Force, supra note 47, at 912.
165 Id. at 909.
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force in the age of war in the fifth dimension.
An example of economic coercion could be found in the events of April 23, 2013. A group
named Syrian Electronic Army hacked the Associated Press Twitter account. Following the
successful operation, the group posted the following tweet on the Associated Press account: “[T]
wo Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured.”166 Immediately after the fake
tweet was posted, and in a matter of only two minutes, the Dow Jones index plunged by about 145
points; equal to nearly 150 billion dollars.167 Although the market recovered soon after the hoax
was revealed, such cyber operation demonstrates the capability to cause major economic damage
with no casualties or physical damage. The relative easiness in manipulating the public and causing
subsequent economic damage requires rethinking the limits of what the use of force paradigm
encompasses.
One view to reconcile this anomaly is to realize that international law content, interpretation
and application change in accordance with the changing security environment and threats.168 When
states eventually understand that cyber attacks of an economic or political coercive nature are as
severe as an armed use of force action, then the interpretation of the use of force scope will also
include economic and political coercions. It is believed that a state will, in fact, treat data destruction
as equivalent to physical destruction.169 Even in the Tallinn Manual itself, some experts took the
approach of severity of consequences—rather than physical effects—in order to determine the use
of force.170 It is also clear that this approach was adopted by some experts to include the targeting
of a state’s economic infrastructure within the scope of the use of force prohibition.171
The proposal suggested by the author is to include the gravest uses of political and economic
coercions in the scope of the use of force paradigm. An example of a grave use of economic
coercion is shutting down the entire credit card transactions clearance system, causing collateral
damage and preventing transactions from being processed. Such a type of cyber attack, while
not causing direct casualties or physical tangible damage, causes severe and serious damage
affecting people’s daily routines. The inclusion of political and economic coercions in the use
of force paradigm is limited only to the most severe, grave and serious attacks with effects that
are comparable to kinetic attacks. Needless to say that such a proposal should either have a basis
in emerging state practice, or be specifically agreed upon in a cyber treaty. The inclusion of the
gravest political and economic coercions will contribute to the purposes of the Charter, which are
maintaining peace and minimizing the use of force between states. As of today, contemporary
international law does not view political or economic coercions as a prohibited type of use of force.
Following the discussion on political and economic coercions as being use of force models, we
166 David Jackson, AP Twitter feed hacked; no attack at White House, usa today (Apr. 23, 2013), available at http://www.
usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/04/23/obama-carney-associated-press-hack-white-house/2106757/.
167 See Peter Foster, ‘Bogus’ AP tweet about explosion at the White House wipes billions off US markets, the telegraPh (Apr.
23, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/10013768/Bogus-AP-tweet-about-explosion-at-theWhite-House-wipes-billions-off-US-markets.html.
168 See Quo Vadis, supra note 39, at 3.
169 See id. at 11.
170 See id. at 11-2.
171 See id. at 12.
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move to examine the challenge of attribution.
4.3. the reQuirement oF attriBution
Attributing a cyber attack to a state can prove to be a challenging task. Cyber attackers are
capable of denying tracing or blurring their identities, through the usage of several cyber techniques.
The difficulty of identifying the perpetrator lies not only in the evasion techniques employed, but in
the following characteristics. Firstly, the Internet does not have an effective “per-call” basis charge
like telephone services; this affects the tracking and tracing of the Internet users.172 Secondly,
the Internet lacks the international cooperation framework between the jurisdictions involved in
a cyber attack. While the International Telecommunications Union provides such a framework
for the telephone system, such agreement does not currently exist between nations.173 Thirdly,
in the past, business did not actively support the investigation and attribution of a cyber attack.
Businesses preferred to reboot their servers and resume in their affairs. As cyber attacks became
more sophisticated and dangerous, the need for attribution and an adequate response grew almost
instantaneously.174 Those three challenges intensify the main problem of attribution—that is the
techniques of the evasion of the perpetrator’s identity. In their article Techniques for Cyber Attacks
Attribution, David Wheeler and Gregory Larsen conclude:
[A]ttribution is difficult and inherently limited. In particular, attackers
can cause attacks to be delayed and perform their attacks through many
intermediaries in many jurisdictions, making attribution difficult. In
some cases this can be partly countered, for example, by treating some
information-gathering techniques as attacks (and attributing them),
using multiple techniques, and using techniques that resist this problem
(such as exploiting/forcing attacker self-identification and attacker
surveillance). Nevertheless, because of the difficulty and uncertainty in
performing attribution, computer network defense should not depend
on attribution. Instead, attribution should be part of a larger defensein-depth strategy. 175
The way in which some cyber attackers mask their identities is through a method called
“Stepping Stones.”176 According to this method, a cyber attack is routed through third-party

172 Jeffrey Hunker et al., Roles and Challenges for Sufficient Cyber-Attack Attribution, institute For inFormation
inFrastructure Protection 5 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.thei3p.org/docs/publications/whitepaper-attribution.
pdf.
173 Id. at 6.
174 See id.
175 David Wheeler et al., Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution, institute For deFense analyses 53 (Oct. 2003),
available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA468859.
176 Cyber Attack Attribution Matters, supra note 90, at 1167.
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computers, which usually belong to an uninvolved state.177 For instance, Ruritania launches a cyber
attack against Utopia, routing the attack through a computer system in Arcadia. When the cyber
attack occurs in Utopia, Utopia tries to identify the perpetrator of the cyber attack, tracing it back to
Arcadia, not realizing that Arcadia is an innocent state. However, even though cyber attackers can
evade or delay their identifications, some techniques are still available to overcome the identification
difficulty—seventeen of them being proposed by Wheeler’s and Larsen’s article.178
To refine the attribution challenge even better, it must be compared to traditional kinetic
attacks. Cyber attacks differ from the kinetic world, in which attacks are conducted in the physical
dimension.179 Kinetic attacks tend to leave physical and circumstantial evidence, such as the
identity of the soldiers or the weapons employed, the geographical location in which the attack
occurred, witnesses and more, while the cyberspace dimension lacks those types of evidence.180
This difference between cyber attacks and the kinetic ones strengthens the notion that the law of
attribution is obsolete or stringent, in the context of attributing cyber attacks. Such a claim has yet
to be examined by state practice and the specificity of the difficulty, rather than a potential challenge
of an abstract nature.
Identifying the perpetrator is not sufficient to attribute the cyber attack to a state. Locating
the attacker is only the first step out of three, in order to trigger the right to lawful self-defense.
Following the process of identifying the attacker, the attacker and his action must be attributed to
a specific state. The attribution tests are discussed above in chapter 3.3.5. After those two steps,
the response should fulfill the requirements of necessity and proportionality, and as part of those
requirements, it must also be immediate or it runs the risk of becoming an unlawful reprisal. In
contrast to a kinetic armed attack, in the cyber context, the effects of a cyber attack are not always
immediate. Moreover, the time-consuming attribution process might also interfere with the
immediacy requirement. Therefore, the immediacy requirement is sometimes challenged in the
cyber context.181
A victim state is also required to show “clear and compelling” evidence of state involvement in a
cyber operation.182 Since state actions are assessed by what was known to the state at the time of its
action, the state is required to establish a reasonably compelling evidence, which would be more than
the civil “more likely than not” standard, but lower than the criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard.183
However, not all cyber attacks can be attributed to a state. We proceed to examine the problem
of independent non-state actors as cyber attackers.
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4.3.1 non-state actors in cyBersPace
As already mentioned earlier in this thesis, some cyber attacks are carried out by independent
non-state actors who are not affiliated to the state in any way, and as so, it is questionable whether
a victim state can exercise its right to self-defense against non-state actors. This concern is highly
important to address, because non-state actors today are capable of achieving damage on a severe
and grave level, which was previously reserved to states only.184 Non-state actors are not parties
to the UN Charter and Article 2(4) does not apply to them.185 However, after the events of 9/11,
the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions that arguably recognize the right to self-defense
against non-state actors in the context of international terrorism.186 The role of non-state actors
in cyberspace is part of a bigger phenomenon, often referred to as the “diffusion of powers.”187
According to Joseph Nye, a professor at the School of Government at Harvard University, there is
a shift of powers from states that had monopoly over power to non-state actors that have recently
found power more and more accessible. Nye comments on the role of non-state actors and explains,
“the barriers to entry in the cyber domain, however, are so low, that non-state actors and small states
can play significant roles at low levels of cost.”188 With regard to the power itself, Nye mentions:
“[W]hat is distinctive about power in the cyber domain is not that governments are out of the
picture, as the early cyber libertarians predicted, but that different actors possess different power
resources and that the gap between state and non-state actors is narrowing in many instances.”189
One way to overcome the difficulty of attribution when the state did not have effective control
over the perpetrators’ actions is to employ a flexible understanding of the attribution requirement
in cyberspace. The law of attribution developed in a time where state involvement was obvious and
easy to prove. The rise of powerful non-state actors who possess destructive cyber powers calls for
an adjustment of the law of attribution. In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice
affirmed “[E]very State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States.”190 Therefore, a state that knows of an individual or a group plans
to launch a cyber attack, and is not acting under the governmental control, must take all necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such cyber attacks from being carried out. However, not all
states that know of a non-state actor—within their territories—that launches a cyber attack or is
expected to launch one are willing to take action. Sometimes, such states are unable to take action,
not because they refuse to do so, but because they are incapable of doing so, militarily, financially
or logistically. In such circumstances, victim states can be given the right to exercise what is known
as the “extraterritorial law enforcement.”191 Dinstein mentions that in those circumstances, victim
states “must [not] patiently endure painful blows, only because no sovereign State is to blame for the
184
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turn of events.”192 In the ICJ Armed Activities case, Judge Kooijmans and Judge Simma emphasized
the importance of not leaving a victim state helpless, saying “[I]t would be unreasonable to deny
the attacked State the right to self-defence merely because there is no attacker state, and the Charter
does not so require.”193
However, the option of the extraterritorial law enforcement is not a carte blanche to self-defense
against non-state actors, but it is a rather narrowly-structured exception to overcome very concrete
situations. Extraterritorial law enforcement should be limited to responses to armed attacks carried
out by non-state actors and only when such an armed attack is expected to recur; the victim state has
to re-affirm the harboring state’s unwillingness or incapability of taking action against the non-state
actor.194 The victim state should also first seek the harboring state’s consent to the law enforcement
action, and such an action should be proportionate, limited to the threat and necessary, which means
that alternative effective measures should be weighed first.195
The drafters of the Tallinn Manual were aware of the attribution problem. However, it seems
that little was done in regard to the adjustment of the law of attribution to cyber attacks. It appears
that more restrictions were put upon victim states in their process of identifying the perpetrators
of a cyber attack. We proceed to examine Tallinn Manual’s interpretation and addition to the law of
attribution.
4.3.2. the tallinn manual on state resPonsiBility
Chapter one, section two of the Tallinn Manual deals with state responsibility. This section
contains four rules. The first one (Rule 6) deals with the legal responsibility of states; the second
and third rules (Rules 7 and 8) analyze the cyber operations launched from the governmental cyber
infrastructure and cyber operations routed through a state, respectively, and the fourth rule (Rule 9)
discusses countermeasures.
Rule 6 of the Tallinn Manual states, “[A] State bears international legal responsibility for a
cyber operation attributable to it and which constitutes a breach of an international obligation.”196
Therefore, it is clear that cyber operations that reach the level of the use of force would be a
breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This conclusion is based on the customary international
law understanding of State responsibility. As stipulated in Article 2 of the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a state is responsible when the act or omission is
attributable to the state under international law, and when it constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the state.197 However, not all cyber operations originating in a state will hold it
responsible under international law. As stated above, the use of force refers to the use of armed
force, and therefore, unless otherwise prohibited in international law, a state would not be held
responsible for the use of economic or political force through cyber operations, or for the use of
192
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cyber operations in espionage.
Rule 7 reads, “[T]he mere fact that a cyber operation has been launched or otherwise originates
from governmental cyber infrastructure is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to
that State, but is an indication that the State in question is associated with the operation.” Rule 8
reads, “[T]he fact that a cyber operation has been routed via the cyber infrastructure located in a
State is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State.” Those rules do not seem
to have a well-established international law source, but rather express an understanding as to the
difference between the traditional usage of governmental infrastructure, i.e. the use of specific stateowned weapons on one hand, and the use of governmental cyber infrastructure on the other, which
does not necessarily indicate state involvement. The commentary to Rule 7 explains:
Prior to the advent of cyber operations, the use of governmental assets,
in particular military equipment, would typically have been attributed
to the State without question because of the unlikelihood of their use
by persons other than State organs or individuals or groups authorized
to exercise governmental functions. This traditional approach cannot
be followed in the cyber context. It may well be that government cyber
infrastructure has come under the control of non-State actors who
then use that infrastructure to conduct cyber operations.198
Unlike Rule 7, which behaves toward the usage of governmental cyber infrastructure in an
impermissible manner to assume State responsibility, Rule 8 deals with cyber operations, which are
merely routed through a state cyber infrastructure. Such cyber operations do not use governmental
cyber infrastructure in a direct fashion, but rather the data is passed through a state cyber
infrastructure, whether governmental or non-governmental. The Tallinn Manual adds that the Group
of Experts were unable to reach a consensus as to whether a state will still be held responsible for
not preventing a cyber operation that is routed through its cyber infrastructure.
The Group of Experts is concerned that states might be hasty in wrongfully attributing a
cyber operation to a state, which is understandable especially because cyber operations can be
routed through the infrastructure of third states. However, Rules 7 and 8 do not reflect any
customary international law norms or treaty law. The Tallinn Manual was intended to reflect existing
international law norms that apply to cyber warfare. The inclusion of Rules 7 and 8 has greatly
complicated the attribution task of the victim state, rather than simplify it. As mentioned above, the
attribution requirement is tricky in the cyberspace context, and burdening it even more would leave
victim states helpless should a cyber attack occur. Moreover, attacking states will refer to Rules 7
and 8 to deny their involvement in the cyber attack.
4.4. anticiPatory selF-deFense against imminent cyBer attacks
Unlike traditional warfare, in the cyber context it could be tricky to act in anticipatory self198 Tallinn Manual, supra note 10, at §7, commentary 3.
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defense, since the lapse of time between the decisions involving the engagement in a cyber-armed
attack, the execution and the consequences of the attack is all a matter of milliseconds.199 As such,
the instances in which a state will successfully defend itself against an imminent cyber attack are
uncommon.
However, a broader theory of anticipatory self-defense, also known as the “Bush Doctrine”
allows engaging in self-defense against the threats that are not necessarily imminent. In 2002, the
National Security Strategy stated: Security Strategy stated:
We must be prepared to stop rogue states . . . before they are able
to threaten or use weapons… Legal scholars and international jurists
often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of
an imminent threat . . . We must adapt the concept of imminent threat
to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries . . . The greater
the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action. 200
Although the Bush doctrine has many opponents, it represents a viable concern with regard
to cyber warfare. Cyber warfare poses a threat not only when imminent, but also when non-state
actors and hostile states acquire the knowledge and technology to carry out such attacks. However,
the Bush Doctrine represents one response of a state to threats, but as Greenwood posits, “[I]n so
far as talk of a doctrine of “pre-emption” is intended to refer to a broader right of self-defence to
respond to threats that might materialize at some time in the future, such a doctrine has no basis in
law.”201
The lack of imminence in cyberspace calls for a change of the understanding of anticipatory
self-defense, as to make it more flexible and adapted to the new reality. However, on the other hand,
providing states with the right to defend themselves against ambiguous and not yet materialized
threats runs the risk of unnecessary uses of force, as well as escalations in hostilities. It remains to
be seen how the international community will respond to the threat of cyber warfare. The response
can be either restrictive to avoid the risk of more uses of unnecessary force, or it can be broad and
flexible, in order to address the fear that many states have against the cyber warfare that will be
targeted at them.
5. conclusion
This thesis demonstrates that while the applicability of the jus ad bellum is important, the
consequences and challenges of the application of the jus ad bellum on cyber warfare are uneasy, and
as Hollis puts it, “even if it applies to [information operations], the existing system suffers from
199 See Quo Vadis, supra note 39, at 14.
200 White House, The National Security of the United States of America, 15 (White House, 2002) www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf (last accessed April 19, 2014).
201 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 san
diego int’l l. J. 7, 15 (2003).
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several, near-fatal conditions: uncertainty… complexity… and insufficiency.”202
It is clear that the jus ad bellum applies to cyber warfare. While the instrument-based approach
is outdated and under-inclusive, the target-based approach is over-inclusive encompasses a wider
array of cyber attacks that will be considered use of force. This will negatively broaden the scope
of applicability of the use of force paradigm. The effects-based approach seems the most feasible
approach to deal with cyber warfare; however, it remains to be developed further and reach wider
consensus on the concretization of the use of force assessment.
From the institutional international law making perspective, the Tallinn Manual lacks the wide
representation of nations. This NATO-sponsored effort to clarify international law applicable to
cyber warfare is not always successful. As discussed in this thesis, while it makes sense to evaluate
a situation involving the use of force by its scale and effects (i.e. the effects-based approach),
the international law origin of the specific criteria developed in the Manual is unclear. Moreover,
the criteria cause ambiguity and do not necessarily contribute to the understanding of the law.
The Tallinn Manual is not the first instance in which international law is developed by experts.
Such efforts were also carried out in the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities, as well as the International Law Commission and many more. However,
those represented a wide array of experts and perspectives, resulting in a relatively balanced and
unbiased interpretation of the law. In order to overcome the challenges that the Tallinn Manual poses
as an instrument, the international community needs to cooperate and engage in a treaty-making
process. Such a process will most likely reach different understanding on what the international law
applicable to cyber warfare is, and it will also represent the view of the international community as a
whole. Moreover, even if the treaty will not be signed and ratified by every single state there is, it will
still have legitimacy and a soft-law weight for the states that are not parties to the treaty.
As far as the substance is concerned, some recommendations are necessary to overcome the
challenges discussed in this thesis. First, with regard to attribution, the Tallinn Manual could have
established permissible and impermissible methods of attribution. Some methods of tracing back
a cyber attack might constitute an act of an impermissible intervention. There must be a clear
framework the methods that are permissible when a victim state traces back the attack, in order
to identify the perpetrator. Moreover, the attribution in cyberspace should be read in the light of
the first chapter of the Tallinn Manual, which emphasizes the state’s duty to exercise sovereignty
and prevent cyber attacks from being conducted or routed through its infrastructure. If states
are cautious and do all they can to prevent cyber attacks that are routed or carried out from their
territories, then it will minimize potential cyber attacks carried out by non-state actors who are
not under the control of that state. The Tallinn Manual prevents attribution on the grounds of
mere routing or the origin of a cyber attack (Rules 7 and 8), but it seems that attribution should be
202 Duncan Hollis, New Tools, New Rules: International Law and Information Operations, G.J. David and T.R. McKeldin
(eds.), ideas as weaPons: inFluence and PercePtion in modern warFare 60 (2004).
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performed on a case-by-case basis and of the available evidence and circumstances.
Second, if the jus ad bellum is focused today on the effects, rather than the instrument employed,
there is no escape from including political and economic coercions in the scope of the use of force.
Cyber attacks allow rather easy and accessible political and economic coercions, and as demonstrated
in the Syrian Electronic Army case example, economic coercion may have similar effects to a
physical armed coercion. The severity of a cyber attack targeting major financial institutions or
governmental infrastructure could be devastating, and excluding those from the scope of the use
of force (and leaving it in a legal vacuum) is not in conformity with the goals and spirit of the
UN Charter and the international community values. The criteria set forth in the Tallinn Manual
require more refinement. The weight of each criterion is vague and the origin of most of them is
ambiguous. There are many other criteria that could be considered in the effects-based approach,
such as the expected damage from the attack, how easily the damage can be averted, the collateral
damage and several others. However, it is clear that the severity of the cyber attack is the most
significant factor in the process of evaluation.

